Castro Romo v. United States of America

Castro Romo v. United States of America, No. 4:12-041 (D. Ariz. Feb. 6, 2015)

On February 6, 2015, the district court awarded the plaintiff, Jesus Castro Romo, $497,943 as damages for injuries he suffered when he was shot by a Border Patrol agent. Following a five day trial, the court found that the Border Patrol agent, who was on horseback, caught up with Mr. Castro and others as they were walking through the Arizona desert. Mr. Castro ran from the agent, who pursued him. Upon catching up to him, the agent threatened Castro, yelled obscenities at him, hit him with the horse’s reins, had the horse poke him from behind, and ultimately shot Castro in his lower back. The court credited Mr. Castro’s version of events and rejected as less credible the agent’s version that Castro was about to throw a rock at him—both because the agent changed his story over time and also because the agent previously had been convicted of taking a bribe while working for the Border Patrol.

Based upon these facts, the court concluded that the agent had committed an intentional battery under Arizona law; that his use of a gun constituted the use of deadly force; that he was not justified in using deadly force; and that the unresolved question of whether Castro had been operating as a “coyote” did not change the fact that it was unreasonable for the agent to use deadly force under these circumstances. The court considered Castro’s action in running from the agent and reduced the damage award by 10%.

The decision sets out in detail the evidence supporting the various types of damages and the court’s calculations of these damages, including past and future medical and psychiatric expenses, economic damages, and pain and suffering. On March 5, 2015, Mr. Castro filed a motion requesting that the court amend its findings of fact and conclusions of law and enter a new judgment increasing the amount of damages awarded. On July 21, 2015, the court agreed to recalculate Mr. Castro’s damages for future pain and suffering and loss of enjoyment of life to account for the effect of inflation. The court increased the original damages award by nearly $20,000 to a new total of $516, 320.82.

Counsel: Risner and Graham

Contact: William J. Risner | (520) 622-7494

Hernandez v. United States of America, sub nom. Hernandez v. Mesa

Hernandez v. United States of America, Nos. 12-50217, 12-50301 (5th Cir.), sub. nomHernandez v. Mesa, No. 15-118 (U.S.)

On June 7, 2010, Sergio Adrian Hernandez Guereca, a fifteen-year-old Mexican national, was playing with a group of friends on the Mexican side of the border near the Paso del Norte Bridge in El Paso, Texas. The boy and his friends were playing a game in which they ran up the incline of a cement culvert, touched the fence separating the US and Mexico and then ran back down the incline. While they were playing, U.S. Border Patrol Agent Jesus Mesa, Jr. stopped one of Hernandez’s friends, and Hernandez retreated and observed from beneath the pillars of the Paso del Norte Bridge (on the Mexico side). Agent Mesa, standing on U.S. soil, fired at least two gun shots from within the country. One of the bullets hit the boy in the face and killed him.

The boy’s parents sued, raising claims against the United States, Agent Mesa, and unknown federal employees. The district court dismissed the claims for various reasons. On June 30, 2014, a three-judge panel of the Fifth Circuit Court of Appeals reversed the lower court in part and affirmed in part. Although the Court affirmed parts of the district court’s decision, significantly, it ruled that the boys’ parents could bring a Fifth Amendment claim against Agent Mesa. In so holding, the court determined that the child had a Fifth Amendment right to be free from actions that “shock the conscience.” Both the United States and Agent Mesa asked the Fifth Circuit to rehear (reconsider) the court’s decision.

On November 5, 2014, the court granted en banc rehearing and vacated its earlier decision. On January 21, 2015, the en banc panel heard oral argument. On April 24, 2015, the Fifth Circuit issued an en banc opinion. On the question of the violation of Sergio’s rights under the Fourth Amendment, the court held that Plaintiffs could not assert a Fourth Amendment claim because Sergio had no significant voluntary connection to the United States and because was physically in Mexico when Agent Mesa shot him. The court further held that Plaintiffs could not assert a Fifth Amendment claim because, at the time of the shooting, no case law reasonably warned Agent Mesa that the prohibition on excessive force applied in this situation.

On October 11, 2016, the Supreme Court granted certiorari and agreed to hear the case. On June 26, 2017, the Supreme Court vacated the judgment of the Fifth Circuit and remanded the case for further proceedings. In its opinion, the Court first addressed the Bivens claim. It determined that a recently decided Supreme Court decision—Ziglar v. Abbasi, which laid out special factors which counsel “hesitation” in applying a Bivens remedy—would inform the analysis of the Bivens question. The Court remanded to give the parties “the opportunity to brief and argue [Abbasi’s] significance” in answering that question. Second, the Court declined to resolve the Fourth Amendment issue before the Court of Appeals could weigh in under the guidance provided by Abbasi. Finally, with respect to the Fifth Amendment claims regarding Mesa’s qualified immunity, the Court held the Fifth Circuit erred when it granted qualified immunity because Hernandez was a noncitizen “who had no significant voluntary connection to…the United States.” Since that fact was not known to Mesa at the time he shot Hernandez, extending qualified immunity was not appropriate. The Court further declined to address the government’s arguments that Mesa was entitled to qualified immunity regardless of his uncertainty about Hernandez’s nationality at the time of the shooting, and that petitioners’ claim was not cognizable at all under the Fifth Amendment.

On remand from the Supreme Court following its decision in Ziglar v. Abbasi, 137 U.S. 1843 (2017), the Fifth Circuit en banc held that a cross-border shooting presented a “new context” for which federal courts do not have the authority to find an implied damages action under Bivens v. Six Unknown Named Agents of the FBI, 403 U.S. 388 (1971). As a result, the Fifth Circuit dismissed plaintiffs’ Bivens claims. On May 28, 2019, the Supreme Court granted certiorari for a second time.

On February 25, 2020, the Supreme Court issued a decision holding that Bivens was unavailable applying the two-part test outlined in Abbasi. The court first determined that the Hernandez family’s Bivens claims arose in a new context. Turning to the second step of the test, the court found “multiple, related factors” counseling hesitation about extending Bivens. The Hernandez family’s case implicates foreign relations, the court reasoned, because of the “legitimate and important interests” of both the United States and Mexico “that may be affected by the way in which this matter is handled.” “It is not our task,” the court said, “to arbitrate between them.” The court also held that the case implicates the “conduct of agents positioned at the border,” which has a “clear and strong connection to national security.” Writing in dissent, Justice Ginsburg argued that holding a rogue, low-ranking officer accountable for killing a teenager would not undermine U.S. diplomacy or national security.

Press Coverage

ACLU of San Diego and Imperial Counties v. DHS et al. (PERF Report FOIA)

ACLU of San Diego and Imperial Counties v. US Department of Homeland Security, US Customs and Border Protection, No.  3:14-cv-01272-BTM-JMA (S.D. Cal., filed May 22, 2014)

In 2013, following intense public pressure and a letter from sixteen members of Congress calling upon Customs & Border Protection (CBP) to address numerous incidents involving excessive force, CBP undertook a comprehensive review of its use of force policies and practices. As part of this review, CBP commissioned a report from the Police Executive Research Forum (PERF), a non-partisan law enforcement think tank based in Washington, DC. PERF completed its review and issued a 23-page report that was highly critical of CBP’s use of force policies and practices. CBP refused to release the report or disclose PERF’s recommendations, and indicated that it would not adopt those recommendations.

In February 2014, the ACLU of San Diego’s Border Litigation Project filed a Freedom of Information Act (FOIA) request with CBP seeking immediate disclosure of the report. CBP failed to respond to the request, forcing the ACLU to file suit May 22, 2014 to compel disclosure.

The following week, CBP finally released the full report, along with a revised Use of Force Policy Handbook that reflected many of PERF’s recommendations. The parties then stipulated to dismissal of the case on June 19, 2014. The case is now closed.

Counsel: ACLU of San Diego and Imperial Counties

Mireles v. Riano, et al.

Mireles v. United States Customs and Border Protection Agent Riano in his individual capacity and the United States of America, No. 1:13-cv-00197 (S.D. Tex., filed Oct. 21, 2013)

Laura Mireles brought this lawsuit against the United States and a CBP officer for violations of her Fourth Amendment rights as well as Texas state law after the officer used unwarranted force and physical abuse before arresting her without any justification at the U.S.-Mexico border.

Ms. Mireles is small in stature, approximately 5’1” tall and 100 pounds, and has a visible malformation of her hands and feet. She has worked at a store on the U.S. side of an international bridge in Brownsville, near the CBP inspection station, since 2005. On November 5, 2012, Ms. Mireles crossed to the Mexican side of the bridge for roughly 15 minutes to pick up keys to lock the store. After she closed the store, CBP Officer Riano stopped Ms. Mireles and searched her car. Ms. Mireles did not interfere with the search and no illegal items were found. Yet the officer became agitated and reacted violently when Ms. Mireles asked him about his search of her handbag. He grabbed her with both hands and threw her onto the ground with such force that her jeans ripped open at the knee and she suffered a large knee wound as well as several cuts and abrasions on her elbows; the officer put his full weight—roughly double that of her own—on Ms. Mireles’s small frame and handcuffed her so tightly that the fire department later had to be summoned to cut the handcuffs from her wrists. Ms. Mireles, who was understandably confused, scared, and crying, asked the agent to explain what was happening. He responded by threatening to hit her if she didn’t “shut up.” After being treated by paramedics for her injuries, Ms. Mireles was released from custody without being charged with an offense.

Ms. Mireles first filed a formal administrative complaint with CBP in March 2013, seeking damages for the serious harm she suffered as a result of Officer Riano’s unlawful actions. That complaint was denied a little more than a month later without explanation. Ms. Mireles subsequently filed suit in federal district court, alleging claims against the United States under the Federal Tort Claims Act (FTCA) and constitutional claims against Officer Riano pursuant to Bivens v. Six Unknown Named Agents of Federal Bureau of Narcotics, 403 U.S. 388 (1971).

The United States moved to dismiss, arguing that it had not waived sovereign immunity under the FTCA based on the customs-duty exception set forth in 28 U.S.C. § 2860(c). Officer Riano sought dismissal based on qualified immunity. Adopting the Magistrate Judge’s Report and Recommendation, the Court found that it lacked jurisdiction to consider the FTCA claims because the United States has not waived sovereign immunity under the customs-duty exception for “[a]ny claim arising in respect of …the detention of any goods, merchandise, or other property by any officer of customs or excise or any other law enforcement officer.” 28 U.S.C. § 2860(c), The Court denied Officer Riano’s Motion to Dismiss, finding that Riano had “violated Mireles’s established constitutional rights,” and was thus not entitled to qualified immunity.

On May 3, 2016, the district court stayed the case pending the outcome of Simmons v. Himmelreich, a Supreme Court case dealing with whether the dismissal of a claim against the U.S. on the basis of an FTCA exception effectively bars separate Bivens actions against individual federal employees because of the FTCA’s judgment bar provision. The Supreme Court unanimously held in June 2016 that the FTCA’s judgment bar provision does not apply, and thus does not affect the claims against the individual defendants. On July 29, 2016, a magistrate judge issued a report and recommendation finding Defendant Riano was not entitled to qualified immunity and recommending the denial of his motion for summary judgment. On September 15, 2016, the court adopted the report and recommendation, and in October of 2016, the parties stipulated to dismiss the case.

Press:

Counsel: ACLU of Texas | Law Office of Gilberto Hinojosa & Associates, P.C. | University of Texas School of Law Civil Rights Clinic

ContactTom Hargis | ACLU of Texas | 832.291.4776 | media@aclutx.org (press)
Edgar Saldivar | ACLU of Texas | esaldivar@aclutx.org (legal)